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Appellant, Christina Cutler ("Cutler") submits this brief in support of her appeal from the
final decision of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for Bannock County,
Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge, presiding.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.

Blaser, Oleson & Lloyd, Chtd. ("BOL"), sued one of its former clients, Christina Cutler,
claiming that an account stated had been formed because she did not dispute a final billing
statement that was sent to her two years after the attorney-client relationship had been
terminated.
B. Course of Proceedings Below.

On January 12, 2017, BOL filed a complaint against Cutler alleging a single count of
account stated. (R. pp. 9-11.) On July 17, 2017, an inactivity notice was served on BOL (R. p.
14), and on July 26, 2017, BOL filed a motion to retain. (R. p. 17.) The summons and complaint
was served on Cutler on August 21, 2017 (R. p. 20), and on September 6, 2017, Cutler filed a
response, prose. (R. pp. 21-23.) A verified amended answer was filed on March 16, 2018. (R.
pp. 48-52.) A bench trial was held on March 30, 2018, and at the conclusion of trial the court

granted BOL's oral motion to amend its complaint to add four new causes of action to conform
to proof at trial-including a breach of contract claim. (Tr. p. 63, L. 21-25; p. 64, L. 1-25; and p.
65, L. 1-23.) On June 26, 2018, the trial court filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
finding for BOL in the amount of $9,788.93, and awarding attorney's fees to BOL as the

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5

prevailing party. (R. pp. 103-107.) Cutler appealed and the District Court affirmed. (R. pp. 231242.)

C. Statement of Facts.
In August 2012, Cutler retained Justin Oleson, Esq., an attorney in the BOL law firm to
represent her in a child custody dispute. Cutler started having questions about BOL's billing in
October or November of 2012. (Tr. p. 32, L. 24-25.) BOL's representation terminated several
months later, on or about July 8, 2013. (Tr. p. 26, L. 10-11.) A final billing statement, dated
July 31, 2013, was sent to Cutler. However, Cutler could not get BOL to discuss her issues with
the bill. (Tr. p. 38, L. 7-8.) On or about July 28, 2014, Cutler had "reached her boiling point"
because BOL just kept "ignoring and ignoring and ignoring" her. (Tr. p. 42, L. 17-22.) So, she
phoned BO L's office and left a message saying she, " ... will not pay another dollar ... because
there was so much that never got done ... " (Tr. p. 42, L. 8-10.) Two years later, in 2016, Cutler
received a demand letter from a collection attorney hired to represent BOL, Ryan Ballard, Esq ..
(Tr. p. 45, L. 8-10.) Subsequently, BOL filed a complaint against Cutler containing one count:
"Count I. Account Stated." (R. p. 10.)
In her trial brief, Cutler argued that "Since plaintiffs complaint lists only a single cause
of action, as follows: 'Count I. Account Stated,' no other causes may be tried." (R. p. 70.)
Rather than asserting that its complaint actually contained two causes of action - account stated
and breach of contract - two days before trial BOL moved to amend its complaint to add "new
causes of action." (R. pp. 58-59.) Cutler objected to the motion on grounds of undue delay and
prejudice (R. pp. 66-68) and submitted a supporting memorandum. (R. pp. 60-65.)
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A bench trial was held on March 30, 2018. At the conclusion of trial, the court granted
BOL's oral motion to amend its complaint to add four new causes of action to conform to proof
at trial, subject to post-trial briefing. (Tr. p. 63, L. 21-25; p. 64, L. 1-25; and p. 65, L. 1-23.)
Post-trial briefs were filed (R. pp. 80-85; and R. pp. 86-102) and on June 26, 2018, the trial court
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order finding for BOL in the amount of
$9,788.93, and awarding attorney's fees to BOL as the prevailing party. (R. pp. 103-107.) Cutler
appealed and the District Court affirmed.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.) Whether the District Court erred by holding BOL's complaint provided notice of a
breach of contract cause of action?
B.) Whether the District Court erred by holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting BOL's motion to amend its complaint?
C.) Whether the District Court erred by concluding the trial court had determined BOL was
the prevailing party on both causes of action?
D.) Whether the trial court's judgment should be remanded for new findings of fact and
conclusions of law?
E.) Whether the award of attorney's fees to BOL as the prevailing party should be reversed?
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III. SCOPE OF REVIEW ON APPEAL

This Court freely reviews questions of law. Regdab, Inc. v. Graybill, 165 Idaho 293,444
P.3d 323 (2019), reh'g dismissed (July 18, 2019) (citing Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Ctr.,
LLC. 158 Idaho 957, 961, 354 P.3d 1172, 1176 (2015)). "The application of [a] procedural rule

is a question of law on which we exercise free review." Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 450,
210 P.3d 552, 558 (2009) (citing Blaser v. Cameron, 116 Idaho 453, 455, 776 P.2d 462, 464
(Ct.App.1989)).
"When deciding whether a trial court abused its discretion, the standard is 'whether the
court perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and
reached its decision by an exercise of reason."' Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,529,284 P.3d
970, 973 (2012) (citing Read v. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 369, 209 P.3d 661, 666 (2009) (citing
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).

IV. ARGUMENT
A. The District Court erred by holding that BOL's complaint provided notice
of a breach of contract claim.

"Generally, a claim for relief need contain only 'a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.... ' I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l) ..... The key issue in determining
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the validity of a complaint is whether the adverse party is put on notice of the claims brought
against it." Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North Pacific Insurance Co., 145 Idaho 241, 178 P.3d
606 (2008).

In the instant case, BOL's complaint contained a single, explicit count: "Count I. Account
Stated." (R. p. 10.) Nevertheless, the District Court held that the complaint provided notice of a
second cause of action - breach of contract, as well. The District Court reasoned as follows: (1)
the complaint contained "the elements of a breach of contract, " therefore, it provided adequate
notice of a breach of contract claim (R. p. 256); (2) if Cutler's claim of inadequate notice was to
succeed, then BOL "must not have been able to prove a breach of contract based on its allegations

contained in the complaint" (R. p. 255); and (3) Cutler "ackrwwledged the existence of a contract,
and in turn, a possible breach of contract claim" because her amended answer included the
affirmative defense of limitation of actions on oral contracts. (R. p. 258.) Each of these reasons is
examined below.

I. Providing notice of a breach of contract claim
requires more than merely reciting the elements
of such a claim.
The District Court reasoned that BOL's complaint provide~ notice of a "potential"'
breach of contract claim because it contained "the elements of a breach of contract. " (R. p.
256.) Under Idaho law, however, more is required. There must be "a clear and concise statement

1

But, cf, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 , 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007),
("[T)he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a
legally cognizable right of action.").

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9

sufficient to place a reasonable attorney on notice of the plaintiffs theories of recovery that must
be defended against." Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 808, 229 P .3d 1164, 1170
(2010) (citing Dewey v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 95 Wash. App. 18, 974 P.2d 847, 851
(1999)).
In Brown v. City of Pocatello, this Court reasoned as follows:
Although a complaint need not identify the statutory basis for relief
nor include a formal statement of the cause of action being
pursued, there must be some indication of the theory of recovery
supporting the relief sought-a naked recitation of the facts alone
is insufficient. Without a clear and concise statement sufficient to
place a reasonable attorney on notice of the plaintiffs theories of
recovery that must be defended against, whether in the body of the
complaint or in the prayer for relief, it cannot be said that a cause
of action was sufficiently pled. Even under the liberal notice
pleading standard, a complaint must reasonably imply the theory
upon which relief is being sought. See Dewey v. Tacoma School
Dist. No. 10, 95 Wash. App. 18,974 P.2d 847, 851 (1999.)
148 Idaho 802, 229 P .3d 1164, 1170 (2010).
In Dewey v. Tacoma School District No. 10, the court wrote:
Under the liberal rules of procedure, pleadings are intended to give
notice to the court and the opponent of the general nature of the
claim asserted. Lewis v. Bell, 45 Wash. App. 192, 197, 724 P.2d
425 (1986). Although inexpert pleading is permitted, insufficient
pleading is not. Lewis, 45 Wash. App. at 197, 724 P.2d 425. 'A
pleading is insufficient when it does not give the opposing party
fair notice of what the claim is and the ground upon which it rests.'
Lewis, 45 Wash. App. at 197, 724 P.2d 425 (citation omitted);
Molloy v. City of Bellevue, 71 Wash. App. 382, 385, 859 P.2d 613
( 1993) (complaint must apprise defendant of the nature of
plaintiffs claims and legal grounds upon which claim rests).

***
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The reasoning of Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash.2d 835, 872 P.2d 1080
(1994), is persuasive. The court held that to give effect to CR 8:
[A] litigant must plead more than general facts in a
complaint to properly allege a CPA [Consumer
Protection Act] cause of action. If no reference is
required to the CPA, a litigant would not have to
amend their complaint to assert a violation. If this
were the rule, a litigant could simply await trial and
surprise their adversary with a CPA claim so long
as enough facts were intermixed in the complaint.
In hindsight it is easy to view facts and agree they
support a CPA claim. It is a much more difficult, if
not an impossible task, to predict whether a plaintiff
will raise such a claim when it is not alleged in the
complaint.
Trask, 123 Wash.2d at 846, 872 P.2d 1080. A complaint must at
least identify the legal theories upon which the plaintiff is seeking
recovery. Molloy, 71 Wash. App. at 389, 859 P.2d 613. Dewey's
amended complaint explicitly identifies seven separate causes of
action. But Dewey's complaint does not identify a free speech or
First Amendment theory, nor does it fairly imply such a theory.
The trial court did not err in finding Dewey's complaint failed to
state a First Amendment claim as a legal theory of recovery.
Dewey v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 95 Wash. App. 18, 25, 974 P.2d 847, 851
(1999).

In the instant case, under the heading "General Allegations," the complaint alleges that
"Cutler retained BOL for legal services;" "BOL performed those legal services;" and "Cutler has
failed to pay." (R. p.10.) Since there was no mention that a breach of contract claim was being
pursued, Cutler reasonably read and understood the general allegations as doing nothing more
than providing one of the essential elements of an account stated claim: "a previous debtor-
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creditor relationship." 2

Cutler's reading and understanding of the complaint was not only

reasonable, in light of the following definition of an account stated, it was accurate, as well:
An account stated has been defined as 'an agreement between the
parties to an account based upon prior transactions between them,
with respect to the correctness of the separate items composing the
account, and the balance, if any, in favor of the one or the other.'
The definition seems to imply a previous debtor-creditor
relationship as a condition of the creation of such a cause of
action, and the courts, as indicated in the cases discussed below,
are in substantial harmony in holding that such a relationship is
necessary .... The necessity for a previous debtor-creditor
relationship between the parties has been pointed out in a large
number and variety of cases." (Emphasis added.)
6 A.L.R.2d 113 (Originally published in 1949).
Lending further support to Cutler's reading and understanding of the complaint's general
allegations was the organizational style and form of the complaint. It was not separated into
multiple causes of action, or counts, and the only claim actually mentioned was account stated.
The complaint uses the words "account stated," "new contract" (three times), "state of the

account," ''final adjustment," and "implied assent," (R. p. 10-11), but makes no mention of any
breach of contract, either specifically, or through use of operative terms typically associated with
such a claim. Read as a whole,3 the complaint is consistent with what is expected where a cause
2

"In order to es tab I ish an account stated, there must be: (I) a showing of mutual assent, between the parties to the
account, as to the correct balance; (2) a promise by one of the parties to the account to pay that balance; and (3) a
previous debtor-creditor relationship between the parties." l pt2 Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms, Accounts and
Accounting§ 73. (Emphasis added).
3

"When being construed, the whole complaint must be considered, and not its disconnected parts. All of the
allegations must be construed together, and it is not proper to segregate the allegations from one another. A pleading
must be read in its entirety, within its four corners, and be construed broadly and realistically. 6 lA Am. Jur. 2d
Pleading § 89
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of action for account stated is being alleged; and the prayer for relief is a generic request for
damages, not inconsistent with what might properly be requested where the sole claim is account
stated. (R. p. 11.)
An analogous situation existed in Brown v. City of Pocatello, where this Court reasoned
as follows:
... Brown's Complaint is not separated into multiple causes of action, and the
only theory of recovery identified is negligence. Brown's Complaint uses the
words 'negligent,' 'negligently,' and 'negligence' but makes no mention of a
nuisance or taking, either specifically or through the use of operative terms
typically associated with these claims. Read as a whole, the allegations
contained in Brown's Complaint are consistent with what is expected where a
cause of action for negligence is being alleged. The prayer for relief is a
generic request for damages, not inconsistent with what might properly be
requested where the sole theory of recovery is negligence. Our liberal notice
pleading standard is intended to see justice done, and prevent the dismissal of
a valid claim for a mere technical failing. However, the opposing party must
be provided with notice of the underlying theories being pursued against
them in order to adequately prepare for trial. Our notice pleading standard
requires more than a naked recitation of facts from which a hyper-vigilant
attorney could possibly foresee the possibility of a given cause of action. A
plaintiff cannot, in his complaint, paint us a picture of a four-legged animal
with fur and a tail labeled "cat" and then assert at summary judgment that the
picture depicts a dog.
148 Idaho 802, 229 P.3d 1164 (2010).
BOL's complaint painted a picture of a four-legged animal with fur and a tail labeled
"Count I Account Stated." Now, BOL asserts that the picture it painted depicts two animals: (1)
an account stated; and (2) a breach of contract. But, without a clear and concise statement
sufficient to place a reasonable attorney on notice of the theory of recovery that must be
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defended against, whether in the body of its complaint, or in the prayer for relief, it cannot be
said that BOL's complaint sufficiently plead a cause of action based on a theory of breach of
contract. See, Brown v. City of Pocatello, supra.
Finally, although the District Court concluded that BOL's complaint contained the
elements of a breach of contract claim, 4 a closer examination reveals that those elements were
not sufficiently plead. A checklist of matters that should be alleged in a complaint in an action
for breach of contract lists several matters that were absent from BOL's complaint. 5

4
The elements of a breach-of-contract claim are: (1) a valid contract binding the parties; (2) the plaintiffs
performance under the contract; (3) the defendant's nonperformance; and (4) resulting damages. 17A Am. Jur. 2d,
Contracts§ 577.
5

Checklist of matters, among others, that should be alleged in a complaint, petition, or declaration in an action for
breach of contract:
• Jurisdictional facts, ifrequired.
• Facts laying venue of the action, ifrequired.
• Diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy, if complaint is to be filed in federal court as a diversity
action.
• Execution of contract, and date.
• Consideration, if contract is oral or there is no presumption of consideration from nature of instrument or
recitals in pleading.
• Whether contract is written or oral.
• Terms of contract, in such manner as to show obligations resting on defendant. (It is generally sufficient to
state the substance and legal effect of the contract, but it may be advisable to attach copy of written contract to
complaint and incorporate by reference.)
• Performance by plaintiff of contract and of conditions precedent, or their waiver.
• Facts showing defendant's breach of contract.
• Injury to plaintiff resulting from defendant's breach.
• Damages.
• Request for relief.
7AP1 Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Contracts§ 38.
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First, BOL's complaint contains no allegations as to the time or place Cutler retained
BOL. "An allegation of time or place is material when testing the sufficiency of a pleading."
I.R.C.P. 9(f). See, Ernst v. Hemenway & Moser, Co., 120 Idaho 941, 945-46, 821 P.2d 996,
1000-01 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Averments of time and place are material and shall be treated like
other averments of material matter. I.R.C.P. 9(f).").

An averment of time was especially

important in the instant case because attorney Oleson of the BOL law firm had performed legal
services for Cutler "throughout his knowing Ms. Cutler" (Tr. p. 14, L. 19-24); and had done "prior
things" for her, not just "this current representation." (Tr. p. 15, L. 8-9.)

Therefore, having

represented Cutler on various matters over a long span of time, BO L's failure to allege the date on
which the parties supposedly entered into a contract constituted a material pleading omission.
Absent such allegation, the complaint failed to sufficiently plead the existence of a valid contract.
Second, BOL's complaint failed to allege any consideration.

"Consideration is an

essential element of, and is necessary to the enforceability or validity of, a contract." 17A Am.
Jur. 2d Contracts§ 105. Third, the complaint failed to allege whether the contract was written or
oral. Fourth, the complaint failed to allege facts showing performance by BOL. It alleged only a
legal conclusion: "BOL performed those legal services." But, "what constitutes full performance
generally depends upon the construction of the contract in light of the surrounding
circumstances." 17 A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 598. Fifth, the complaint failed to allege facts
showing a breach of contract. The word breach appears nowhere in the complaint and the bare
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allegation that Cutler ''failed to pay," is insufficient to show a breach of contract. 6 (R. p. 256.)
Finally, the complaint contained no averment as to the time Cutler supposedly breached the
contract. Merely alleging that Cutler failed to pay (at some unknown time) is insufficient to state a
claim for breach of contract.

2. The test for dismissing a complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) should not have been used to determine
whether the complaint provided notice of a breach of
contract claim.
The key issue in determining the validity of a complaint is whether the adverse party is put
on notice of the claims brought against it." Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North Pacific Insurance
Co., 145 Idaho 241, 178 P.3d 606 (2008). The test for determining whether a complaint provided

adequate notice of a cause of action is whether it contains "a clear and concise statement sufficient
to place a reasonable attorney on notice of the plaintiffs theories of recovery that must be
defended against." Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 808, 229 P .3d 1164, 1170 (2010).
In the instant case, however, the District Court applied a different test - that for deciding
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss 7

-

when it concluded that Cutler's claim of inadequate notice

could not succeed. The District Court wrote that BOL "must not have been able to prove a breach
of contract based on its allegations contained in the complaint." (R. p. 255.)

6

The reviewing court may not read in allegations that are totally absent. 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading§ IOI.

7

"For a complaint to be dismissed under Rule l2(b)(6) on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim, it must
appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief." Ernst v. Hemenway & Moser, Co., 120 Idaho 941, 946, 821 P.2d 996, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991).
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The test for dismissing a complaint under Rule 12(b)( 6) should not have been used by the
District Court to determine whether BOL' s complaint provided notice of a breach of contract claim.

3. There was no acknowledgment by Cutler that
BOL 's complaint contained a breach of contract
cause ofaction.
The District Court held that it was "reasonable for the trial court to conclude that

Cutler's affirmative defense constituted acknowledgement of the existence of a contract, and in
turn, a possible breach of contract claim that could later be properly added if granted by the
court. " (R. pp. 257-258.) To reach its conclusion, the District Court followed the reasoning in
Zattiero v. Homedale School District No. 370, 137 Idaho 568, 51 P.3d 382 (2002).
In Zatierro, this Court found that the defendant acknowledged a breach of contract claim
by filing an answer which stated: "[t]o the extent that Plaintiff alleges a breach of contract,
defendant did not breach such contract .... " Although not cited by the District Court, there are
two companion cases to Zattiero: Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N Pac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241,
178 P.3d 606 (2008), and Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 95 P.3d 34
(2004). In Seiniger Law Office, this Court found that the defendant understood and responded to
a contract claim because its answer raised the "affirmative defense that it had discharged its
contractual obligations;" and the defendant "moved for summary judgment as to the bad faith
breach of contract claim."
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In Vendelin, this Court held that the defendant's answer

acknowledged plaintiffs punitive damages claim because it raised "three separate defenses" to
the punitive damages claim.
In contrast to Zattiero, Seiniger Law Office and Vendelin, in Villa Highlands, LLC v.
Western Community Insurance Co., 148 Idaho 598, 226 P.3d 540 (2010), this Court took a wider

view of the proceedings to determine whether the defendant was on notice of a breach of contract
claim and found that "it is not readily apparent from either the defendant's answer or its
subsequent briefing and comments at hearings that it was on notice of a direct breach of contract
claim against it." Villa Highlands, LLC v. Western Community Insurance Co. The Court looked
well beyond the defendant's answer and reasoned that, "Based upon the district court's findings,
as well as our own review of the Second Amended complaint, the defendant's answer, the
briefing on the motions ... and the arguments presented by counsel, we find that Villa Highlands
did not sufficiently plead a direct breach of contract claim .... " Ibid. See, also, Sundstrand Corp.
v. Standard Kollsman Indus., Inc., 488 F.2d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1973) ("And in deciding whether

a complaint fairly notifies a defendant of matters sought to be litigated, courts have often looked
beyond the pleadings to the pretrial conduct and communications of the parties.").
In the instant case, analogous to Villa Highlands, a review of Cutler's amended answer
(R. pp. 48-52); her trial brief (R. pp. 70-73); her memorandum in support of objection to

plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint (R. pp. 60-65); and arguments presented by counsel
during trial finds no readily apparent acknowledgement of any breach of contract claim. Rather,
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as Cutler made clear on several occasions, she read and understood the complaint to contain
"only a single cause of action." For example, in her trial brief Cutler wrote:
Since plaintiffs complaint lists only a single cause of action, as follows:
'COUNT I. ACCOUNT STATED,' no other causes of action may be
tried ... .If the plaintiff attempts to argue any cause of action not plead, for
example, 'breach of contract ' or 'unjust enrichment,' then defendant's
affirmative defense of the statute of limitations under Idaho Code § 5-217,
will come into play .... (Emphasis added).
(R. pp. 70-71.)
Upon receiving Cutler's trial brief, BOL immediately moved to amend its complaint to
add four new counts, including one for breach of contract, "in order to allow the issue of what
causes of action will be dealt with at trial to be addressed beforehand." (R. p. 59.)
If its complaint already included a breach of contract cause of action, then why didn't

BOL just say so? Why did BOL find it necessary to amend its complaint to add a breach of
contract claim? Significantly, nowhere in the record does BOL affirmatively take the position
that its complaint, in fact, contained a breach of contract claim. The closest it came to that was at
the beginning of the trial, after it had already moved to amend, when BOL's counsel said in
passing, "the common facts would support a breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum
meruit and open account." (Tr. p. 11, L. 23-24.)
Under these facts, where the attorney who drafted the complaint failed to argue that it
contained a breach of contract claim, but instead, moved to add such a claim by amendment; and
when Cutler reasonably read and understood the complaint to contain "only a single cause of
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action, account stated," then justice8 is not done when after trial the court, sua sponte, construes
the pleadings to find a breach of contract claim intermixed in the complaint's general allegations
that neither party ever saw and then rules against Cutler because "She should have been prepared
to refute that the contract existed." (R. p. 106.) As the court in Trask reasoned,
In hindsight it is easy to view facts and agree they
support a ... claim. It is a much more difficult, if not
an impossible task, to predict whether a plaintiff
will raise such a claim when it is not alleged in the
complaint.
Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash.2d 835, 872 P.2d 1080 (1994).

The trial court's use of hindsight to discover a breach of contract claim intermixed in the
complaint's allegations did not do justice in this case. The fact the trial court found elements of
a breach of contract in the general allegations does not mean Cutler had adequate notice of a
breach of contract cause of action. It was impossible for Cutler to have predicted BOL would
pursue a breach of contract cause of action based on the scant general allegations contained in
the complaint. Not even BOL, itself, could see a breach of contract cause of action in its
complaint. That is precisely why it sought to add a breach of contract to its complaint claim by
amendment.

Notably, at no point during trial did the court inquire of BOL whether its complaint
contained a breach of contract claim. Indeed, it was well understood by the parties, and the court

8

I.R.C.P. 8( e), requires that, "Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice."
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itself, that if a breach of contract claim was to become part of the litigation, it would have to be
added by amendment. 9 Using hindsight to construe the pleadings, and knowing full-well that
BOL wanted to add a breach of contract claim to the litigation, and that Cutler strongly opposed
adding such a claim, the trial court did not do justice as required by Rule 8( e).
Finally, the District Court concluded that it was "reasonable for the trial court to

conclude that Cutler's affirmative defense constituted acknowledgement of the existence of a
contract, and in turn, a possible breach of contract claim that could later be properly added if
granted by the court." (R. pp. 257-258.) Cutler's affirmative defense read as follows:
Limitation of actions: Under Idaho Code § 5-217, entitled, 'Action
on oral contract,' a civil action upon a contract not founded upon
an instrument of writing can only be commenced within four (4)
years after the cause of action accrued. Accordingly, any and all
claims that plaintiff may have had against defendant which accrued
more than four (4) years prior to January 12, 2017, the date
plaintiffs complaint was filed, are barred by the statute of
limitations, Idaho Code§ 5-217.
(R. p. 50.)
"The statute of limitations ordinarily must be pled by stating the facts which show that
the cause of action is barred by the statute." 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 3 80. But
here, Cutler did not state any facts showing that a particular cause of action was barred by the
statute. Far from acknowledging an existing cause of action, Cutler merely stated that "any and
all claims the plaintiff may have had" are barred. She was anticipating that BOL might seek to
9

"If the parties at the trial have adopted a certain construction of the pleadings, the court should give deference to
that construction." 6 IA Am. Jur. 2d Pleading§ 86
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add a breach of contract of contract claim to its complaint, and by referencing Idaho Code § 5217, she was providing advance warning that if BOL tried to do that, then the statute of
limitations would be plead as a defense. The District Court acknowledged this when it wrote:
Although the language of Cutler's affirmative defense was not as
explicit as that in Zattiero, this Court determines that it was
reasonable for the magistrate court to conclude that Cutler's
affirmative defense constituted acknowledgment of the existence
of a contract, and in tum a possible breach of contract claim that
could later be properly added if granted by the court. As such, the
magistrate court was correct in determining that Cutler was put on
notice and did acknowledge the possibility of a breach of contract
claim in her Amended Answer, and ultimately was responsible to
have been prepared to defend such claims.

(R. pp. 236-237.)
But Cutler's acknowledging the possibility of a breach of contract claim is a far different
matter than if she had readily acknowledged such a claim was actually present in the complaint.
Therefore, it is respectfully requested the Supreme Court hold that the District Court
erred by concluding BOL's complaint provided Cutler with notice of a breach of contract cause
of action; that the test for dismissing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) should not have been used
by the District Court to determine whether the complaint provided notice of a cause of action for
breach of contract; and that the District Court erred by concluding Cutler acknowledged the
existence of a cause of action for breach of contract in her answer.
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B. The District Court erred by holding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting BOL's motion to amend its complaint.

The grant or denial of leave to amend after a responsive pleading has been filed is a
matter that is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal on appeal only for
an abuse of that discretion. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, NA.,
119 Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991) (citing 6 Wright & Miller, Fed. Practice &
Procedure

,r

1484. Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 874-875, 673

P.2d 1067, 1068 (1983) ("The allowance of amendment to pleadings is a matter not to be
disturbed absent a showing of clear error .... A court may, in its discretion, allow such
amendment, unless to do so would deprive the complaining party of some substantial right.")).

1. Granting BOL 's motion to amend its complaint to add four new
causes of action at the conclusion of trial prejudiced Cutler.
The District Court concluded the trial court was within its discretion to grant BOL's oral
motion to amend its complaint, under I.R.C.P. 15(b)(l), 10 to conform to the evidence presented
during trial because "the elements of breach of contract were present in the original complaint. "
(R. p. 259.) But nowhere in the record - from the time the complaint was filed to the time the
10

Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule l 5(b )(1 ), "If, at trial, a party objects that evidence is not within
the issues raised in the pleadings, the court may permit the pleadings to be amended ... The court may grant a
continuance to enable the objecting party to meet the evidence." However, an amendment to conform to the proof
may be authorized only when it does not substantially change the cause of action. 61 B Am. Jur. 2d, Pleading §
763. Indeed, the basic rule applicable to amendments of the pleadings to conform to the proof is that the amended
pleading must be based upon the same general set of facts as those upon which the cause of action originally pleaded
was grounded. (Emphasis added.) Ibid.
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trial concluded - does it show that either party, or the court, found elements of a breach of
contract claim in the complaint. The following excerpts from the transcript show BOL made
repeated efforts to add four additional causes of action to its complaint during the trial. At the
beginning of trial, BOL moved to amend, saying:
I have a motion, yes. Yes. We have a motion to amend the complaint...!
believe .. .it's excusable as far as the timing of this motion. I do not believe
there's any prejudice to the defendant .. .I just think that adding these other
causes of action will make sure we get to the ultimate issue and not, you
know, worry about technicalities of -- .. .it was reasonable to give the
defendant notice that we intended to put on evidence as to those other legal
theories.

(Tr. p. 5, L. 15-25; Tr. p. 6, L. 16-19; Tr. p. 7, L. 5-7.)
The court delayed ruling on the motion saying, "Well, if we were to allow the trial to go
forward and allow you to present evidence on the other legal theories, it's possible that that
wouldn't be a necessity. Would it?" (Tr. p. 6, L. 20-23.) Cutler's counsel objected, "Your
Honor, we're not prepared to argue these new causes of action. I mean has the court seen my
objection to the motion to amend?" (Tr. p. 7, L. 15-17.) Counsel argued as follows:
Currently, and for the last 140 [440] 11 days, they stood on account stated. A
day before trial, they amend to add all these others. They've had over a
year .... an account stated is a new contract. So, we've been dealing with
defending against their claim that there'd been a new contract formed, an
account stated, by her silence to the billing statements. So, we're prepared to
defend against a new contract. We have not spent any time at all looking into
the facts of a different contract. And the different account [contract] that
they're alleging is the old attorney-client contract and all the water that's
gone under the bridge in that relationship. If they want to talk about that
contract, it brings up a whole new set of facts.
11

Court's CD recording states "440" days.
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(Tr. p. 8, L. 7-10, L. 15-25; Tr. p. 9, L. 1-3.)
The court responded, "How do you prove an account stated if you don't prove the
underlying contract?" (Tr. p. 9, L. 4-5.) Cutler's counsel responded:
... Your Honor, I hope I'm making my point clear; that we're here to talk
about a new contract, defend against the allegation that there's a new
contract. ... We're not prepared, we haven't had a chance to prepare because
we only knew Monday, Monday afternoon of this week, a day and a half ago,
that they wanted to talk about the old contract.
(Tr. p. 10, L. 22-25; Tr. p. 11, L. 1-4.)
BOL's counsel interjected,
You know, Idaho is a notice pleading state. We've put on notice in our
account stated that there was a contract, that Mr. BOL did the work under the
contract. And so again, the common facts would support a breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and open account.
(Tr. p. 11, L. 20-25.)
The court said,
All right. Well, I think what I'm going to do is I'm going to allow you to
proceed with the complaint that you have filed. And depending upon what
proof you present, and I'll be liberal in allowing you to present proof on those
other theories, allow you to move to amend to conform to the pleadings
should that be necessary. Okay?
(Tr. p. 12, L. 1-7.)
Then, at the conclusion of trial, BOL again moved to add a breach of contract cause of
action to its complaint, as well as several others, and stated to the trial court, as follows:
So then perhaps - well, let me - I guess I'll orally make a motion to amend
the complaint to conform to the evidence. To add claims for - you know, I
had my notes to make sure I said that, and then I didn't read my notes. So,
yes. We would like to move to conform to the evidence to add claims for
breach of contract, open account, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit.
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(Tr. p. 63, L. 4-6 and 21-25; Tr. p. 64, L. 1.)
Cutler's counsel again objected, arguing,
I object, Your Honor. And it goes back to my objection that I didn't want to
allow any of this evidence in about the preexisting contract, the old contract.
I just wanted to talk about the account stated contract that they alleged was
formed ... by her silence to the last bill. That's the contract we're prepared to
address today .... I've submitted a written objection to this motion to amend,
Your Honor. And if you'd consider that.
(Tr. p. 64, L. 11-23.)
Nevertheless, without granting a continuance so Cutler could meet the new evidence
presented at trial, the court granted BOL's motion to amend its complaint to add the four new
causes of action. The court reasoned as follows:
And I'll state my reasoning. But I'm going to allow the amendment. I think
Rule 15 requires it, unless there is substantial prejudice to the defendant.
And I think that the way I look at the case is that there isn't a lot of -well,
first of all, I think that the existence of an account stated presumes that
there's a contract. Otherwise there wouldn't be -- there wouldn't be a cause
of action, regardless. So, I think breach of contract comes under that.
(Tr. p. 65, L. 4-13.)
Although the trial court was basically correct when it reasoned that "the existence of an
account stated presumes that there's a contract," 12 it acted outside of applicable legal standards
governing accounts stated, and therefore, abused its discretion by concluding, as a matter of law,

12

"In order to establish an account stated, there must be: (1) a showing of mutual assent, between the parties to the
account, as to the correct balance; (2) a promise by one of the parties to the account to pay that balance; and (3) a
previous debtor-creditor relations/tip between tlte parties." lpt2 Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms, Accounts and
Accounting§ 13. (Emphasis added).
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that "breach of contract comes under that." (Tr. P. 65, L. 4-13; and R. p. 188.) A breach of
contract claim does not automatically "come under" an account stated claim. Rather, an account
stated is an independent cause of action from an action on the underlying contract. Cutler made
that distinction clear in her post-trial brief, as follows:
An account stated constitutes a new contract, distinct from any original
agreement, and the amount or balance agreed upon constitutes a new and
independent cause of action. I Am. Jur. 2d, Accounts and Accounting § 4.
An account stated constitutes a new contract which supersedes and
extinguishes the original obligation. Zinn v. Fred R. Bright Co., 76 Cal. Rptr.
663 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). An 'action upon an account stated is not upon the
original dealings and transactions of the parties,' rather it is 'upon the new
contract and under which the parties have adjusted their differences and
reached an agreement.' Martini E. Ricci !amino S.P.A.--Consortile Societa
Agricola v. W Fresh Mktg. Servs., Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1107 (E.D. Cal.
2014). An action for an account stated is founded upon a promise to pay that
debt, not the original promise to pay under the contract. Patrick Engineering,
Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, 364 Ill. Dec. 40, 976 N.E. 2d 318
(Ill. 2012). 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Accounts and Accounting § 41. To establish a
claim for account stated, a plaintiff must show the existence of a 'new
contract by and under which the parties have adjusted their differences and
reached an agreement.' Gardner v. Watson, 170 Cal. 570, 574, 150 P. 994
(1915). Advanced Cleanup Techs., Inc. v. BP Am. Inc. , No. CV14-9033-CAS
(AJWX), 2016 WL 67671, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2016). When the account
is assented to, it becomes a new contract. An action on it is not founded upon
the original items, but upon the balance agreed to by the parties. Inquiry may
not be had into those matters at all. It is upon the new contract by and under
which the parties have adjusted their differences and reached an agreement.
Gleason v. Klamer, 103 Cal.App.3d 782, 786-87, 163 Cal.Rptr. 483 (1980).
Although a plaintiff must show that, at the time of stating the account, there
had been previous dealings and transactions with the defendant, it is not
necessary to 'show the books of original entries from which the account is
made up since the very object in rendering, stating, and settling accounts is to
avoid the necessity of making such proof.' 1 Fla. Jur. 2d Accounts and
Accounting§ 14.
In the instant case, plaintiffs complaint set forth one cause of action: account
stated. The complaint alleges that the parties formed 'a new contract.'
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Accordingly, given the facts alleged in the complaint tending to show that the
parties had formed a new contract, the defendant appropriately prepared her
defense to show that no new contract had been formed. To successfully
defend against plaintiffs account stated claim, the defendant would need to
garner and present evidence proving that those specific facts alleged in
plaintiffs complaint suggesting silent assent to an entirely new contract were
untrue. Understanding full-well that the account stated claim would require
plaintiff to prove facts showing formation of a new contract, and knowing
further, that the original, underlying contract between the parties may not be
inquired into, the defendant developed her defense accordingly. She had no
legal reason to spend any time delving into the facts and circumstances
surrounding the original contract entered into by the parties in 2012. The
original contract was not at issue. Only when the plaintiff submitted its
Amended complaint did the original contract become an issue.

Paragraph 28 of the plaintiff's amended complaint contains a crucial factual
allegation that appeared nowhere in the original complaint, as follows:
"Cutler breached the contract on August 31, 2013 ... " Clearly, requiring
Cutler to defend against that new factual allegation with discovery closed,
with only one day before trial, and with no opportunity to file an amended
answer, is prejudicial error.
(R. pp. 93-95.)
Further, in her post-trial brief Cutler argued that granting BOL's motion to amend the
complaint to conform to the proof at trial would unduly prejudice her defense, as follows:
'[U]ndue delay' is one valid reason for a district court to deny a party leave to
amend. McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 1988).
'[P]rejudice' is another valid reason for a district court to deny a party leave
to amend. Where the new claims would have required additional discovery,
additional research and rewriting of trial briefs, the resulting delay and
expense would have prejudiced the defendants, who were entitled to rely on a
timely close of discovery and a near-term trial date. McG!inchy v. Shell
Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 1988).
In the instant case, plaintiff's complaint was filed on January 12, 2017, well
over a year ago. Under Rule 15(a), the plaintiff could have amended its
complaint once as a matter of course at any time before defendant served her
responsive pleading on September 6, 2017. However, for whatever reason,
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plaintiff chose to stand by its complaint, as filed. Plaintiff chose not to
amend at any time during the nine (9) month period of time between filing its
complaint and the time it was served defendant's responsive pleading. Even
then, from the time defendant served her responsive pleading on September
6, 2017, until today, March 27, 2018, being another six (6) months, plaintiff
has not sought to amend its complaint. All told, plaintiff had four-hundred
thirty-nine (439) days from the date he filed his complaint until trial to seek
to amend his complaint, but he failed to do so. There was no reason for
plaintiffs more-than-a-year delay; and it is therefore, undue delay.
Just one day before trial the plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to add
four entirely new causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Open Account;
(3) Unjust Enrichment; and (4) Quantum Meruit. If the Court grants
plaintiffs Motion to Amend, then the defendant will have clearly been
prejudiced because putting the defendant in the untenable position of having
to prepare defenses to plaintiffs four new causes of action in a single
working day is unfair.
The Court's own Order Setting Pretrial and Trial required that 'Discovery
shall be completed prior to pretrial conference and all pretrial motions shall
be heard at or before the pretrial conference.' Therefore, since discovery was
closed the defendant had absolutely no opportunity for any discovery related
to plaintiffs new claims. Further, to adequately prepare defenses the
defendant and her counsel would need to overhaul their entire trial strategy.
They would need time to delve into and dispute plaintiffs newly alleged
facts .

***
Finally, the Court indicated during trial that it would be 'liberal in allowing
[the plaintiff] to present proof on .. .other theories, and allow [the plaintiff] to
move to amend to conform to the [evidence] should that be necessary.'
However, an amendment to conform to the proof may be authorized only
when it does not substantially change the cause of action. 61 B Am. Jur. 2d,
Pleading § 763. Indeed, the basic rule applicable to amendments of the
pleadings to conform to the proof is that the amended pleading must be based
upon the same general set of facts as those upon which the cause of action
originally pleaded was grounded. 61B Am. Jur. 2d, Pleading §763.
Because plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action is based upon an
entirely different set of facts than the account stated cause of action, the
Court should deny plaintiffs motion to amend its complaint to conform to the
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proof.

The breach of contract cause of action is based on the original

attorney-client contract entered into by and between the parties some six
years ago during July 2012. The account stated cause of action is based on a
set of facts surrounding the alleged formation of a separate and distinct
contract in 2017.
Therefore, plaintiffs substantive amendment that
introduces an entirely new cause of action - breach of contract - and calls for
substantially different evidence, should properly be denied. See, 61B Am.
Jur. 2d, Pleading§ 745.
For the foregoing reasons, including specifically plaintiffs undue delay and
the resulting prejudice to the defendant, this Court should deny plaintiffs
Motion to Amend complaint.
(R. pp. 87-90.)
Nevertheless, in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, the trial court

grantedBOL's motion to amend, reasoning as follows:
To complain that, based on the facts of this matter, a request to amend a
complaint even two days before trial is prejudicial lacks merit. Therefore, the
Court in its discretion allows the amendment of the complaint to conform to
the proof at trial. Cutler has not satisfied the Court that under the
circumstances, she would be prejudiced in her defense.
(R. p. 106.)
The trial court seems to have reasoned that the complaint put Cutler on notice of a
breach of contract claim, but even if it didn't, then since the account stated claim

"implied" a breach of contract claim, then allowing the amendment to add such a claim at
the close of trial would not prejudice Cutler because "She should have been prepared to
refute that the contract existed." (R. p. 106.)

By concluding, as a matter of law, that the complaint put Cutler on notice of a breach of
contract claim when the record plainly shows that she neither understood the complaint to
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contain, nor responded to, any such claim; and further, by concluding, as a matter of law, that the
account stated claim implied a breach of contract claim that Cutler "should have been prepared to
refute," the trial court erred. In turn, these errors of law ultimately lead the trial court into
abusing its discretion by allowing BO L's amendment at the close of trial to conform to the proof
at trial because "Cutler has not satisfied the Court that under the circumstances, she would be
prejudiced in her defense." (R. p. 106.) Cutler was quite clearly prejudiced, indeed, she lost at
trial, because she had no opportunity to prepare a defense to the new breach of contract claim.

2. BOL 's breach of contract cause ofaction, added
by amendment, did not relate back to the date of
its complaint, and was therefore, time-barred.

Under Idaho Code § 5-217, actions on oral contracts must be brought within four years.
When, on March 26, 2018, BOL moved to add a breach of contract claim to its complaint, it had
been four years and seven months since the cause of action arose. 13
"In determining whether an amended complaint should be allowed, where leave of court is
required under Rule 15(a), the court may consider whether the new claims proposed to be inserted
into the action by the amended complaint state a valid claim .... If the amended pleading does not set
out a valid claim, or if the opposing party would be prejudiced by the delay in adding the new claim,
or if the opposing party has an available defense such as a statute of limitations, it is not an abuse of

13

BOL's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law include the following proposed finding: "Ms.Cutler
breached the contract on August 31, 2013, when she failed to make payment after the last work was performed and
billed on her account." (R. p. 83.)
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discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to file the amended complaint." Black Canyon
Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 804 P .2d 900 (1991 ).

In Black Canyon, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that claims in a
proposed amended complaint were barred by the statute of limitations because they did not relate
back to the date of the complaint. This Court wrote, as follows:
Given the fact that the motion for leave to file the amended complaint was not
filed until five and one-half years after the events alleged to have constituted the
new tort claims occurred, and because these new tort causes of action were
entirely different from the claim of an oral contract to lend money contained in
the complaint, and because the new claims relied in part upon new facts not
alleged in the complaint, the trial court concluded that the tort claims in the
amended complaint did not relate back to the time of filing of the complaint
under I.R.C.P. 15(c), and were barred by the statute of limitations. As a result,
the trial court denied leave to amend the complaint. We conclude that the trial
court did not err or abuse its discretion in so holding. (citing Wing v. Martin,
107 Idaho 267,688 P.2d 1172 (1984)). (Emphasis added.)
119 Idaho 171,804 P.2d 900 (1991).
Relation back is governed by I.R.C.P. 15(c)(l)(B). It provides that an amendment to a
pleading relates back to the date of the pleading where "the amendment asserts a claim or defense
that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out, or attempted to be set out, in the
pleading."

In Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 270, 688 P.2d 1172, 1175 (1984), this Court reasoned
that "Here the trial court held that the proffered amendment constituted a new cause of action,
rather than merely a modification of the original claim. Where, by way of amendment, a party is
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setting forth a new cause of action, it does not relate back." "It is well-established that the
touchstone for relation back is fair notice, because Rule 15(c) is premised on the theory that a party
who has been notified of litigation concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice
that statutes of limitations were intended to provide." Glover v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 83 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 481, 698 F.3d 139 (3 rd Cir. 2012).

"Thus, only where the

opposing party is given 'fair notice of the general fact situation and the legal theory upon which the
amending party proceeds,' will relation back be allowed.

Conversely, amendments 'that

significantly alter the nature of a proceeding by injecting new and unanticipated claims are treated
far more cautiously." Ibid. "Rule 15(c) cannot save a complaint that obscures the factual predicate
and legal theory of the amended claim ... Pleadings are not like magic tricks, where a plaintiff can
hide a claim with one hand, only to pull it from his hat with the other." Id. The Federal Rules do not
place the onus on the defendant to piece together the disparate fragments of a disjointed complaint
to distill the essence of a claim. Courts frown on 'pleading by means of obfuscation, because a
pleading that is 'prolix and/or confusing makes it difficult for the defendant to file a responsive
pleading and makes it difficult for the trial court to conduct orderly litigation." Id.

"Although the

relation-back rule ameliorates the effect of statutes of limitations, it does not save the claims of
complainants who have sat on their rights." Id.
As previously argued, BOL's complaint failed to provide notice of any breach of contract
cause of action that arose in the year 2013. The complaint alleged only a cause of action for account
stated that arose in the year 2016. Since the account stated cause of action arose three years after
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the alleged breach of contract cause of action arose, it cannot be said that the breach of contract
claim arose out of the account stated claim. The two causes of action occurred more than three years
apart from each other. There was no nexus between them. They involve two independent factual
scenarios - a breach of contract in 2013 and an entirely new and different contract in 2016 - each
one giving rise to independent causes of action. "An account stated constitutes a new contract,
distinct from any original agreement, and the amount or balance agreed upon constitutes a new
and independent cause of action." 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Accounts and Accounting§ 4.
Therefore, it is respectfully requested the Supreme Court hold that the District Court erred in
concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting BOL's motion to amend its
complaint at the conclusion of trial to add four new causes of action; and further hold, that the
breach of contract cause of action, added by amendment, did not relate back to the date of BOL's
complaint, and was therefore, barred by the statute oflimitations on oral contracts, I.C. § 5-217.
C. The District Court erred by concluding the trial court had determined BOL was
the prevailing party on both causes of action.

"Where the judgment is ambiguous or fails to express the rulings with clarity, the entire
record before the issuing court and the findings of fact may be referenced in determining what
was decided, for res judicata purposes." 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 68.
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In its decision on appeal, the District Court wrote that "The record reflects that the trial
court made the determination that BOL was the prevailing party in both causes of action." 14
(Emphasis added.) (R. p. 262.) However, neither BOL nor Cutler understood the trial court's
decision that way. They believed the trial court found in favor of BOL only on its breach of
contract cause of action. Indeed, BOL, itself, submitted the following written argument to the
District Court in its Respondent's Brief: the trial court "did not err or abuse its discretion in
determining BOL had proven a breach of contract." (R. p. 212.) And as to the account stated
cause of action, BOL submitted the following written argument to the District Court:

Also, though not spelled out clearly enough in the conclusions of law
to satisfy Appellant, from the factual findings it is clear [the] court
determined there was a basis for account stated claim .... The
magistrate court stated in its Findings of Facts that BOL sent a final
statement dated November 30, 2016 and that Cutler assented by never
making any specific objections to the amount owed after receiving the
statement, but rather made a pair of settlement offers which were
rebuffed. (Emphasis added.)
(R. pp. 210-211.)
However, review of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reveals no
finding of "assent" by Cutler.

Quite the opposite, the trial court found that Cutler had a

longstanding "dispute" with BOL over its billing; "she refused to pay;" she "expressed

dissatisfaction; " and she "attempted to question the bill directly to Oleson. " The relevant
portions of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are as follows:

14

The two causes of action being referenced by the District Court were account stated and breach of contract.
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On February 25, 2014 Oleson sent Cutler a 'closing letter' because she
refused to pay for his representation.
Cutler had expressed
dissatisfaction with Oleson's representation and hired William
Trahant to represent her as a tribal advocate .... Cutler had attempted to
dispute the bill in the letter of June 27, 2013 and had attempted to
question the bill directly to Oleson and secretarial staff on several
occasions. Other than her letter above there is no particular item she
disputed in her testimony. However, Defendant's Exhibit B is a
telephone log of a note on July 28, 2014 in which she noted that she
wanted her file and she was refusing to pay because she felt Oleson
had not done work that should have been performed.
(R. p. 104.)

Absent mutual assent, there can be no account stated. 15 Since the trial court found no
mutual assent, it could not have determined that BOL was the prevailing party on its account
stated cause of action.
Rather, the trial court devoted most of its conclusions of law to explaining why it granted
BOL 's motion to add a breach of contract claim to its complaint at the end of the trial, and also,
why Cutler should have been prepared to refute the existence of the contract. (R. pp. 105-106.)
Although the trial court failed to express its ruling with clarity, a review of its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law makes clear that it determined BOL was the prevailing party only on the
breach of contract cause of action, and not on the account stated cause of action.

15
"In order to establish an account stated, there must be:(\) a showing of mutual assent, between the parties to the
account, as to the correct balance; (2) a promise by one of the parties to the account to pay that balance; and (3) a
previous debtor-creditor relationship between the parties." (Emphasis added.) lpt2 Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms,
Accounts and Accounting§ 73.
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Therefore, it is respectfully requested the Supreme Court hold that the District Court
erred by concluding that the trial court had determined BOL was the prevailing party on both
causes of action (account stated and breach of contract).
D. The trial court's judgment should be remanded for new findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

"Where the trial court's findings of fact are confused or in conflict, or where findings on a
particular issue are lacking, and resort to the record does not show clearly what findings are
correct, the district court ordinarily will not modify the judgment. The district court will either
remand for new findings, or, alternatively, act under LC. s 1-2213(2) and I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2) and
conduct a partial or whole trial De novo." Hawkins v. Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785, 789, 589 P.2d
532, 536 (1978).
In the instant case, the trial court adopted inconsistent positions on whether BOL's complaint
included a breach of contract cause of action. First, it granted BOL's motion, made pursuant to
Rule l 5(b) at the conclusion of trial, to amend its complaint to add four new causes of action,
including breach of contract. (Tr. p. 63, L. 21-25; p. 64, L. 1-25; and p. 65, L. 1-23.). But then,
much later, when drafting its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court found that
a breach of contract cause of action had existed in BO L's complaint all along. (R. p. 105.)
However, the record shows that the trial court failed to see a breach of contract claim in
BOL's complaint at any point throughout the entire course of the litigation up to and including
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the bench trial. It was only long after trial, when the court was drafting its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law that it, sua sponte, found elements of a breach of contract claim intermixed
in the complaint's general allegations.

Therefore, it is respectfully requested that the Supreme Court remand the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order so the trial court can clarify whether BOL's breach of contract cause
of action was added to the litigation by amendment under Rule l 5(b), or whether the claim as set
forth in the original complaint governs.

E. Award of attorney's fees to BOL as the prevailing party should be reversed on
appeal.

The trial court concluded that BOL was the prevailing party based upon a breach of contract
cause of action and awarded attorney fees to BOL under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(1).

The District

Court affirmed.
The Supreme Court should reverse the award of attorney's fees to BOL on the following
grounds: (1) BOL's complaint failed to provide notice of a breach of contract claim; (2) granting
BOL's motion to amend its complaint to add four new causes of action at the conclusion of trial,
including the breach of contract cause of action, constituted an abuse of discretion; and (3) BOL's
breach of contract cause of action, added by amendment at the conclusion of trial, did not relate
back to the date of its complaint and was barred by the statute of limitations governing oral
contracts. Accordingly, BOL did not prevail on any breach of contract cause of action.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested the Supreme Court hold that the
District Court erred by concluding BOL' s complaint provided notice of a breach of contract
cause of action; Cutler did not acknowledge a breach of contract cause of action in her answer;
the District Court erred by concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting
BO L's motion to amend its complaint to add four new causes of action at the conclusion of trial;
and BOL's breach of contract cause of action, added by amendment at the conclusion of trial,
was barred by the statute of limitations governing oral contracts.
It is further respectfully requested that the Supreme Court hold that the District Court

erred by concluding the trial court had determined BOL was the prevailing party of both causes
of action (account stated and breach of contract) insofar as the trial court found no account stated
and there was no breach of contract cause of action properly before the court.
The judgment of the District Court affirming the trial court should be reversed.
Submitted this 31 st day of December 2019.
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